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Рылся на русском сайте компании Apple в разделе "Образование" и нашел вот такую ссылку:

 

CIA - The World Factbook. Масса информации о странах мира от ЦРУ (на английском языке).

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

 

Большая часть информации взята, судя по всему, из справочника "Страны мира", издаваемого ЦРУ, и продающегося иногда в наших магазинах в русскоязычном варианте. Вот, например, небольшая информация с этого сайта о России. Именно из этого источника я узнал, что мы живем в Северной Азии :)

 

Russia

Location:

Northern Asia (the area west of the Urals is considered part of Europe), bordering the Arctic Ocean, between Europe and the North Pacific Ocean

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валяется где-то на винте в виде отдельной программы. При Союзе издавалась такае книжечка - Полит-экономический атлас мира, CIA - The World Factbook это электронное подобие ессесенно в актулизированном виде. Так что СССР впереди планеты всей.

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Американские органы, наверное, смущены таким пристальным вниманием наших форумчан к ним.

О такой книжечке мы уже наслышаны, равно как и об ошибках, имеющих местов ней быть. Однако, от констатации прошедшего, хотелось бы направить взор в будущее. Так, ни на одном из отечественных сайтов лично я не нашел конкурента данной работе.

At no time since the formation of the Western alliance system in 1949 have the

shape and nature of international alignments been in such a state of flux. The end

of the Cold War shifted the tectonic plates, but the repercussions from these momentous

events are still unfolding. Emerging powers in Asia, retrenchment in Eurasia, a roiling

Middle East, and transatlantic divisions are among the issues that have only come to a

head in recent years. The very magnitude and speed of change resulting from a

globalizing world—apart from its precise character—will be a defining feature of the

world out to 2020. Other significant characteristics include: the rise of new powers, new

challenges to governance, and a more pervasive sense of insecurity, including terrorism.

As we map the future, the prospects for increasing global prosperity and the limited

likelihood of great power conflict provide an overall favorable environment for coping

with what are otherwise daunting challenges. The role of the United States will be an

important variable in how the world is shaped, influencing the path that states and

nonstate actors choose to follow.

New Global Players

The likely emergence of China and India, as well as others, as new major global

players—similar to the advent of a united Germany in the 19th century and a

powerful United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical

landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those in the previous two

centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the “American

Century,” the 21st century may be seen as the time when Asia, led by China and India,

comes into its own. A combination of sustained high economic growth, expanding

military capabilities, and large populations will be at the root of the expected rapid rise in

economic and political power for both countries.

Most forecasts indicate that by 2020 China’s gross national product (GNP) will

exceed that of individual Western economic powers except for the United States.

India’s GNP will have overtaken or be on the threshold of overtaking European

economies.

Because of the sheer size of China’s and India’s populations—projected by the US

Census Bureau to be 1.4 billion and almost 1.3 billion respectively by 2020—their

standard of living need not approach Western levels for these countries to become

important economic powers.

Barring an abrupt reversal of the process of globalization or any major upheavals in

these countries, the rise of these new powers is a virtual certainty. Yet how China and

India exercise their growing power and whether they relate cooperatively or

competitively to other powers in the international system are key uncertainties. The

economies of other developing countries, such as Brazil, could surpass all but the

largest European countries by 2020; Indonesia’s economy could also approach the

economies of individual European countries by 2020.

By most measures—market size, single currency, highly skilled work force, stable

democratic governments, and unified trade bloc—an enlarged Europe will be able to

increase its weight on the international scene. Europe’s strength could be in providing a

model of global and regional governance to the rising powers. But aging populations

and shrinking work forces in most countries will have an important impact on the

continent. Either European countries adapt their work forces, reform their social

welfare, education, and tax systems, and accommodate growing immigrant populations

(chiefly from Muslim countries), or they face a period of protracted economic stasis.

Japan faces a similar aging crisis that could crimp its longer run economic recovery, but

it also will be challenged to evaluate its regional status and role. Tokyo may have to

choose between “balancing” against or “bandwagoning” with China. Meanwhile, the

crisis over North Korea is likely to come to a head sometime over the next 15 years.

Asians’ lingering resentments and concerns over Korean unification and cross-Taiwan

Strait tensions point to a complicated process for achieving regional equilibrium.

Russia has the potential to enhance its international role with others due to its position

as a major oil and gas exporter. However, Russia faces a severe demographic crisis

resulting from low birth rates, poor medical care, and a potentially explosive AIDS

situation. To the south, it borders an unstable region in the Caucasus and Central Asia,

the effects of which—Muslim extremism, terrorism, and endemic conflict—are likely to

continue spilling over into Russia. While these social and political factors limit the

extent to which Russia can be a major global player, Moscow is likely to be an important

partner both for the established powers, the United States and Europe, and for the

rising powers of China and India.

With these and other new global actors, how we mentally map the world in 2020 will

change radically. The “arriviste” powers—China, India, and perhaps others such as

Brazil and Indonesia—have the potential to render obsolete the old categories of East

and West, North and South, aligned and nonaligned, developed and developing.

Traditional geographic groupings will increasingly lose salience in international relations.

A state-bound world and a world of mega-cities, linked by flows of telecommunications,

trade and finance, will co-exist. Competition for allegiances will be more open, less

fixed than in the past.

Impact of Globalization

We see globalization—growing interconnectedness reflected in the expanded flows of

information, technology, capital, goods, services, and people throughout the world—as

an overarching “mega-trend,” a force so ubiquitous that it will substantially shape

all the other major trends in the world of 2020. But the future of globalization is not

fixed; states and nonstate actors—including both private companies and NGOs—will

struggle to shape its contours. Some aspects of globalization—such as the growing

global interconnectedness stemming from the information technology (IT) revolution—

almost certainly will be irreversible. Yet it is also possible, although unlikely, that the

process of globalization could be slowed or even stopped, just as the era of globalization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was reversed by catastrophic war and global

depression.

Barring such a turn of events, the world economy is likely to continue growing

impressively: by 2020, it is projected to be about 80 percent larger than it was in

2000, and average per capita income will be roughly 50 percent higher. Of course,

there will be cyclical ups and downs and periodic financial or other crises, but this basic

growth trajectory has powerful momentum behind it. Most countries around the world,

both developed and developing, will benefit from gains in the world economy. By

having the fastest-growing consumer markets, more firms becoming world-class

multinationals, and greater S&T stature, Asia looks set to displace Western countries as

the focus for international economic dynamism—provided Asia’s rapid economic growth

continues.

Yet the benefits of globalization won’t be global. Rising powers will see exploiting

the opportunities afforded by the emerging global marketplace as the best way to assert

their great power status on the world stage. In contrast, some now in the “First World”

may see the closing gap with China, India, and others as evidence of a relative decline,

even though the older powers are likely to remain global leaders out to 2020. The

United States, too, will see its relative power position eroded, though it will remain in

2020 the most important single country across all the dimensions of power. Those left

behind in the developing world may resent China and India’s rise, especially if they feel

squeezed by their growing dominance in key sectors of the global marketplace. And

large pockets of poverty will persist even in “winner” countries.

The greatest benefits of globalization will accrue to countries and groups that can

access and adopt new technologies. Indeed, a nation’s level of technological

achievement generally will be defined in terms of its investment in integrating and

applying the new, globally available technologies—whether the technologies are

acquired through a country’s own basic research or from technology leaders. The

growing two-way flow of high-tech brain power between the developing world and the

West, the increasing size of the information computer-literate work force in some

developing countries, and efforts by global corporations to diversify their high-tech

operations will foster the spread of new technologies. High-tech breakthroughs—such

as in genetically modified organisms and increased food production—could provide a

safety net eliminating the threat of starvation and ameliorating basic quality of life issues

for poor countries. But the gap between the “haves” and “have-nots” will widen unless

the “have-not” countries pursue policies that support application of new technologies—

such as good governance, universal education, and market reforms.

Those countries that pursue such policies could leapfrog stages of development,

skipping over phases that other high-tech leaders such as the United States and Europe

had to traverse in order to advance. China and India are well positioned to become

technology leaders, and even the poorest countries will be able to leverage

prolific, cheap technologies to fuel—although at a slower rate—their own

development.

The expected next revolution in high technology involving the convergence of nano-,

bio-, information and materials technology could further bolster China and India’s

prospects. Both countries are investing in basic research in these fields and are well

placed to be leaders in a number of key fields. Europe risks slipping behind Asia in

some of these technologies. The United States is still in a position to retain its

overall lead, although it must increasingly compete with Asia to retain its edge and

may lose significant ground in some sectors.

More firms will become global, and those operating in the global arena will be

more diverse, both in size and origin, more Asian and less Western in orientation.

Such corporations, encompassing the current, large multinationals, will be

increasingly outside the control of any one state and will be key agents of change

in dispersing technology widely, further integrating the world economy, and

promoting economic progress in the developing world. Their ranks will include a

growing number based in such countries as China, India, or Brazil. While North

America, Japan, and Europe might collectively continue to dominate international

political and financial institutions, globalization will take on an increasingly non-Western

character. By 2020, globalization could be equated in the popular mind with a rising

Asia, replacing its current association with Americanization.

An expanding global economy will increase demand for many raw materials, such as oil.

Total energy consumed probably will rise by about 50 percent in the next two decades

compared to a 34 percent expansion from 1980-2000, with a greater share provided by

petroleum. Most experts assess that with substantial investment in new capacity,

overall energy supplies will be sufficient to meet global demands. But on the supply

side, many of the areas—the Caspian Sea, Venezuela, and West Africa—that are being

counted on to provide increased output involve substantial political or economic risk.

Traditional suppliers in the Middle East are also increasingly unstable. Thus sharper

demand-driven competition for resources, perhaps accompanied by a major

disruption of oil supplies, is among the key uncertainties.

China, India, and other developing countries’ growing energy needs suggest a

growing preoccupation with energy, shaping their foreign policies.

For Europe, an increasing preference for natural gas may reinforce regional

relationships—such as with Russia or North Africa—given the interdependence of

pipeline delivery.

New Challenges to Governance

The nation-state will continue to be the dominant unit of the global order, but

economic globalization and the dispersion of technologies, especially

information technologies, will place enormous new strains on governments.

Growing connectivity will be accompanied by the proliferation of virtual communities of

interest, complicating the ability of states to govern. The Internet in particular will spur

the creation of even more global movements, which may emerge as a robust force in

international affairs.

Part of the pressure on governance will come from new forms of identity politics

centered on religious convictions. In a rapidly globalizing world experiencing population

shifts, religious identities provide followers with a ready-made community that serves as

a “social safety net” in times of need—particularly important to migrants. In particular,

political Islam will have a significant global impact leading to 2020, rallying

disparate ethnic and national groups and perhaps even creating an authority that

transcends national boundaries. A combination of factors—youth bulges in many

Arab states, poor economic prospects, the influence of religious education, and the

Islamization of such institutions as trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, and

political parties—will ensure that political Islam remains a major force.

Outside the Middle East, political Islam will continue to appeal to Muslim migrants

who are attracted to the more prosperous West for employment opportunities but do

not feel at home in what they perceive as an alien and hostile culture.

Regimes that were able to manage the challenges of the 1990s could be overwhelmed

by those of 2020. Contradictory forces will be at work: authoritarian regimes will face

new pressures to democratize, but fragile new democracies may lack the adaptive

capacity to survive and develop.

The so-called “third wave” of democratization may be partially reversed by

2020—particularly among the states of the former Soviet Union and in Southeast

Asia, some of which never really embraced democracy. Yet democratization and

greater pluralism could gain ground in key Middle Eastern countries which thus far have

been excluded from the process by repressive regimes.

With migration on the increase in several places around the world—from North Africa

and the Middle East into Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean into the United

States, and increasingly from Southeast Asia into the northern regions—more countries

will be multi-ethnic and will face the challenge of integrating migrants into their societies

while respecting their ethnic and religious identities.

Chinese leaders will face a dilemma over how much to accommodate pluralistic

pressures to relax political controls or risk a popular backlash if they do not. Beijing

may pursue an “Asian way of democracy,” which could involve elections at the local

level and a consultative mechanism on the national level, perhaps with the Communist

Party retaining control over the central government.

With the international system itself undergoing profound flux, some of the

institutions that are charged with managing global problems may be

overwhelmed by them. Regionally based institutions will be particularly challenged to

meet the complex transnational threats posed by terrorism, organized crime, and WMD

proliferation. Such post-World War II creations as the United Nations and the

international financial institutions risk sliding into obsolescence unless they adjust to the

profound changes taking place in the global system, including the rise of new powers.

Pervasive Insecurity

We foresee a more pervasive sense of insecurity—which may be as much based on

psychological perceptions as physical threats—by 2020. Even as most of the world

gets richer, globalization will profoundly shake up the status quo—generating

enormous economic, cultural, and consequently political convulsions. With the

gradual integration of China, India, and other emerging countries into the global

economy, hundreds of millions of working-age adults will become available for

employment in what is evolving into a more integrated world labor market.

This enormous work force—a growing portion of which will be well educated—will be

an attractive, competitive source of low-cost labor at the same time that

technological innovation is expanding the range of globally mobile occupations.

The transition will not be painless and will hit the middle classes of the

developed world in particular, bringing more rapid job turnover and requiring

professional retooling. Outsourcing on a large scale would strengthen the antiglobalization

movement. Where these pressures lead will depend on how political

leaders respond, how flexible labor markets become, and whether overall economic

growth is sufficiently robust to absorb a growing number of displaced workers.

Weak governments, lagging economies, religious extremism, and youth bulges

will align to create a perfect storm for internal conflict in certain regions. The

number of internal conflicts is down significantly since the late 1980s and early 1990s

when the breakup of the Soviet Union and Communist regimes in Central Europe

allowed suppressed ethnic and nationalistic strife to flare. Although a leveling off point

has been reached where we can expect fewer such conflicts than during the last

decade, the continued prevalence of troubled and institutionally weak states means that

such conflicts will continue to occur.

Some internal conflicts, particularly those that involve ethnic groups straddling national

boundaries, risk escalating into regional conflicts. At their most extreme, internal

conflicts can result in failing or failed states, with expanses of territory and populations

devoid of effective governmental control. Such territories can become sanctuaries for

transnational terrorists (such as al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan) or for criminals and drug

cartels (such as in Colombia).

The likelihood of great power conflict escalating into total war in the next 15 years

is lower than at any time in the past century, unlike during previous centuries

when local conflicts sparked world wars. The rigidities of alliance systems before

World War I and during the interwar period, as well as the two-bloc standoff during the

Cold War, virtually assured that small conflicts would be quickly generalized. The

growing dependence on global financial and trade networks will help deter interstate

conflict but does not eliminate the possibility. Should conflict occur that involved one or

more of the great powers, the consequences would be significant. The absence of

effective conflict resolution mechanisms in some regions, the rise of nationalism in

some states, and the raw emotions and tensions on both sides of some issues—for

example, the Taiwan Strait or India/Pakistan issues—could lead to miscalculation.

Moreover, advances in modern weaponry—longer ranges, precision delivery, and more

destructive conventional munitions—create circumstances encouraging the preemptive

use of military force.

Current nuclear weapons states will continue to improve the survivability of their

deterrent forces and almost certainly will improve the reliability, accuracy, and lethality

of their delivery systems as well as develop capabilities to penetrate missile defenses.

The open demonstration of nuclear capabilities by any state would further discredit the

current nonproliferation regime, cause a possible shift in the balance of power, and

increase the risk of conflicts escalating into nuclear ones. Countries without nuclear

weapons—especially in the Middle East and Northeast Asia—might decide to

seek them as it becomes clear that their neighbors and regional rivals are doing

so. Moreover, the assistance of proliferators will reduce the time required for additional

countries to develop nuclear weapons.

Transmuting International Terrorism

The key factors that spawned international terrorism show no signs of abating

over the next 15 years. Facilitated by global communications, the revival of Muslim

identity will create a framework for the spread of radical Islamic ideology inside and

outside the Middle East, including Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Western Europe,

where religious identity has traditionally not been as strong. This revival has been

accompanied by a deepening solidarity among Muslims caught up in national or

regional separatist struggles, such as Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, Mindanao,

and southern Thailand, and has emerged in response to government repression,

corruption, and ineffectiveness. Informal networks of charitable foundations,

madrassas, hawalas (Hawalas constitute an informal banking system.), and other mechanisms will continue to proliferate and be

exploited by radical elements; alienation among unemployed youths will swell the ranks

of those vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.

We expect that by 2020 al-Qa’ida will be superceded by similarly inspired Islamic

extremist groups, and there is a substantial risk that broad Islamic movements akin to

al-Qa’ida will merge with local separatist movements. Information technology, allowing

for instant connectivity, communication, and learning, will enable the terrorist threat to

become increasingly decentralized, evolving into an eclectic array of groups, cells, and

individuals that do not need a stationary headquarters to plan and carry out operations.

Training materials, targeting guidance, weapons know-how, and fund-raising will

become virtual (i.e., online).

Terrorist attacks will continue to primarily employ conventional weapons, incorporating

new twists and constantly adapting to counterterrorist efforts. Terrorists probably will be

most original not in the technologies or weapons they use but rather in their operational

concepts—i.e., the scope, design, or support arrangements for attacks.

Strong terrorist interest in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

weapons increases the risk of a major terrorist attack involving WMD. Our greatest

concern is that terrorists might acquire biological agents or, less likely, a nuclear

device, either of which could cause mass casualties. Bioterrorism appears

particularly suited to the smaller, better-informed groups. We also expect that terrorists

will attempt cyber attacks to disrupt critical information networks and, even more likely,

to cause physical damage to information systems.

Possible Futures

In this era of great flux, we see several ways in which major global changes could take

shape in the next 15 years, from seriously challenging the nation-state system to

establishing a more robust and inclusive globalization. In the body of this paper we

develop these concepts in four fictional scenarios which were extrapolated from the key

trends we discuss in this report. These scenarios are not meant as actual forecasts,

but they describe possible worlds upon whose threshold we may be entering,

depending on how trends interweave and play out:

Davos World provides an illustration of how robust economic growth, led by China

and India, over the next 15 years could reshape the globalization process—giving it

a more non-Western face and transforming the political playing field as well.

Pax Americana takes a look at how US predominance may survive the radical

changes to the global political landscape and serve to fashion a new and inclusive

global order.

A New Caliphate provides an example of how a global movement fueled by radical

religious identity politics could constitute a challenge to Western norms and values

as the foundation of the global system.

Cycle of Fear provides an example of how concerns about proliferation might

increase to the point that large-scale intrusive security measures are taken to

prevent outbreaks of deadly attacks, possibly introducing an Orwellian world.

Of course, these scenarios illustrate just a few of the possible futures that may develop

over the next 15 years, but the wide range of possibilities we can imagine suggests that

this period will be characterized by increased flux, particularly in contrast to the relative

stasis of the Cold War era. The scenarios are not mutually exclusive: we may see two

or three of these scenarios unfold in some combination or a wide range of other

scenarios.

Policy Implications

The role of the United States will be an important shaper of the international order in

2020. Washington may be increasingly confronted with the challenge of managing—at

an acceptable cost to itself—relations with Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and others

absent a single overarching threat on which to build consensus. Although the

challenges ahead will be daunting, the United States will retain enormous

advantages, playing a pivotal role across the broad range of issues—economic,

technological, political, and military—that no other state will match by 2020.

Some trends we probably can bank on include dramatically altered alliances and

relationships with Europe and Asia, both of which formed the bedrock of US power in

the post-World War II period. The EU, rather than NATO, will increasingly become the

primary institution for Europe, and the role which Europeans shape for themselves on

the world stage is most likely to be projected through it. Dealing with the US-Asia

relationship may arguably be more challenging for Washington because of the greater

flux resulting from the rise of two world-class economic and political giants yet to be fully

integrated into the international order. Where US-Asia relations lead will result as much

or more from what the Asians work out among themselves as any action by

Washington. One could envisage a range of possibilities from the US enhancing its role

as balancer between contending forces to Washington being seen as increasingly

irrelevant.

The US economy will become more vulnerable to fluctuations in the fortunes of others

as global commercial networking deepens. US dependence on foreign oil supplies also

makes it more vulnerable as the competition for secure access grows and the risks of

supply side disruptions increase.

While no single country looks within striking distance of rivaling US military

power by 2020, more countries will be in a position to make the United States pay

a heavy price for any military action they oppose. The possession of chemical,

biological, and/or nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea and the possible

acquisition of such weapons by others by 2020 also increase the potential cost of any

military action by the US against them or their allies.

The success of the US-led counterterrorism campaign will hinge on the capabilities and

resolve of individual countries to fight terrorism on their own soil. Counterterrorism

efforts in the years ahead—against a more diverse set of terrorists who are connected

more by ideology than by geography—will be a more elusive challenge than focusing on

a centralized organization such as al-Qa’ida. A counterterrorism strategy that

approaches the problem on multiple fronts offers the greatest chance of

containing—and ultimately reducing—the terrorist threat. The development of

more open political systems and representation, broader economic opportunities, and

empowerment of Muslim reformers would be viewed positively by the broad Muslim

communities who do not support the radical agenda of Islamic extremists.

Even if the numbers of extremists dwindle, however, the terrorist threat is likely to

remain. The rapid dispersion of biological and other lethal forms of technology

increases the potential for an individual not affiliated with any terrorist group to be able

to wreak widespread loss of life. Despite likely high-tech breakthroughs that will make it

easier to track and detect terrorists at work, the attacker will have an easier job than the

defender because the defender must prepare against a large array of possibilities.

The United States probably will continue to be called on to help manage such conflicts

as Palestine, North Korea, Taiwan, and Kashmir to ensure they do not get out of hand if

a peace settlement cannot be reached. However, the scenarios and trends we analyze

in the paper suggest the possibility of harnessing the power of the new players in

contributing to global security and relieving the US of some of the burden.

Over the next 15 years the increasing centrality of ethical issues, old and new,

have the potential to divide worldwide publics and challenge US leadership.

These issues include the environment and climate change, privacy, cloning and

biotechnology, human rights, international law regulating conflict, and the role of

multilateral institutions. The United States increasingly will have to battle world public

opinion, which has dramatically shifted since the end of the Cold War. Some of the

current anti-Americanism is likely to lessen as globalization takes on more of a non-

Western face. At the same time, the younger generation of leaders—unlike during the

post-World War II period—has no personal recollection of the United States as its

“liberator” and is more likely to diverge with Washington’s thinking on a range of issues.

In helping to map out the global future, the United States will have many opportunities to

extend its advantages, particularly in shaping a new international order that integrates

disparate regions and reconciles divergent interests.

 

Какие будут мнения по поводу?

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Американские органы, наверное, смущены таким пристальным вниманием наших форумчан к ним.

О такой книжечке мы уже наслышаны, равно как и об ошибках, имеющих местов ней быть. Однако, от констатации прошедшего, хотелось бы направить взор в будущее. Так, ни на одном из отечественных сайтов лично я не нашел конкурента данной работе.

 

Какие будут мнения по поводу?

11802[/snapback]

Да уж, влияние нашего форума на геополитику просто поражают воображение. Вероятно, специально для нас в США вскоре создадут специальный отдел :)

 

Если серьезно, то конкурент - не конкурент, но сама эта статья в ее более полном варианте и на русском языке в Интернете есть. Она столь длинная, что мне не хочется ее выкладывать здесь полностью, поэтому просто даю ссылку.

 

Вот ее начало:

Очертания будущего мира или Отчёт по Проекту 2020 Национального совета по разведке – это третий подготовленный за последние годы Национальным советом по разведке (НСР) США открытый отчёт, в котором представлено долгосрочное видение будущего. Он позволяет по-новому взглянуть на перспективы развития глобальных тенденций в ближайшие полтора десятилетия. Учитывая, что существует не один вариант будущего, в нашем отчёте представлен набор возможных вариантов и потенциальных точек разрыва, что позволит объективно и без упущений взглянуть на развитие ситуации.

 

Как я часто говорил своим студентам в Принстоне, линейный анализ приведёт вас к сильно изменённой гусенице, но не позволит вам вывести бабочку. Для этого вам понадобится скачок воображения. Мы надеемся, что этот проект, а также диалог, который он вызовет, помогут нам осуществить этот скачок – не для того, чтобы предсказать, каким будет мир в 2020 г., что явно не в наших силах, но чтобы лучше подготовить нас к вызовам будущего...

 

Роберт Л. Хатчингс (Robert L. Hutchings)

Председатель Национального совета по разведке

 

К основным и относительно определенным положениям Глобального ландшафта 2020 года можно отнести, что

 

· Глобализацию, в основном, не повернуть назад, но, скорее всего, она станет менее вестернизированной;

· Мировая экономика существенно вырастет;

· Растущее число ТНК облегчит распространение новых технологий;

· Рост в Азии и возможное появление новых экономических середняков;

· Произойдет старение населения в традиционных державах;

· Запасы энергетических ресурсов будут оставаться значительными, чтобы обеспечить мировой спрос;

· Рост силы неправительственных игроков;

· Политический ислам будет оставаться мощной силой;

· Будет заметен рост потенциала ОМУ в целом ряде стран;

· Дуга нестабильности включит в себя Ближний Восток, Азию и Африку;

· Перерастание конфликта сверхдержав в тотальную войну будет маловероятным;

· Осуществится рост значения природоохранных и этических вопросов;

· США останутся единственным и самым мощным игроком в экономике, политике и военной сфере.

 

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"Россия обладает потенциалом усиления своей международной роли благодаря своему статусу основного экспортёра нефти и газа. Однако Россия сталкивается с сильным демографическим кризисом по причине низкой рождаемости, плохого медицинского обслуживания и грозящей взорваться ситуацией со СПИДом". - обидно такое читать...

 

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